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Schiavone v. Fortune: Notice Becomes a Threshold Requirement
for Relation Back under Federal Rule 15(c)
Easy answers rarely satisfy. The United States Supreme Court recently
clarified the notice requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), which
applies when a plaintiff seeks to change defendants by amending the original
complaint.' Rule 15(c) permits the amended pleading to relate back to the date
of the original pleading if, among other requirements, the joined defendant re-
ceives notice of the action "within the period provided by law for commencing
the action against him." 2 In Schiavone v. Fortune3 the Court held that the rela-
tion-back defendant brought in under rule 15(c) must receive notice prior to the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.4 Furthermore, the Court ex-
pressly rejected an interpretation of the rule that would have allowed notice to
occur within the time for service of process under local law in addition to the
statute of limitations period.5
The Court viewed Schiavone as a question of statutory construction. Con-
sistent with the principles for statutory interpretation, the Court adhered to the
rule's plain language. 6 The Schiavone Court's emphasis on interpretation, how-
ever, understates the problem that created a split among the circuit courts apply-
ing rule 15(c). When literally applied to the notice requirement, the phrase,
"within the period provided by law for commencing the action against [the rela-
tion-back defendant]," produces a double standard: the relation-back defendant
possesses more rights than the original defendant and he or she benefits from a
more stringent notice requirement than might be called for under local law if the
original complaint had named the proper party in the first instance. Further-
more, a plain language interpretation of the phrase necessarily implicates
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,7 in which the Court held that state law determines
1. Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986).
2. FaD, R. Civ. P. 15(c). The full text of rule 15(c) reads:
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing
the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such
notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his
defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concern-
ing the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or
the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a
proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with
respect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as
a defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986)
4. Id. at 2385.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
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when an action was commenced for statute of limitations purposes. 8 The Schia-
vone Court, however, failed to acknowledge that precedent. This Note examines
the inherent defect in rule 15(c) that created a division among the circuit courts
and reviews the Walker analysis that undermines the basis of the Court's deci-
sion. It concludes that the Court's emphasis on the technical requirement of
notice threatens rule 15(c)'s effectiveness and signals the need to amend the rule.
On May 9, 1983, plaintiff in Schiavone filed a diversity action against For-
tune magazine in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey.9 The complaint alleged that defamatory statements had appeared in the
lead article of the magazine's May 30, 1982 issue. 10 Under New Jersey law the
date of substantial distribution determines publication and triggers the one year
statute of limitations. 1 In Schiavone substantial distribution of the May 30,
1982, issue occurred, at the latest, on May 19, 1982. The district court chose
this date because newsstand copies of the issue were available for sale on May
17, and subscribers received the magazines between May 13 and May 19. Thus,
the statutory period for libel suits arising out of the May 30, 1982, issue of For-
tune expired on May 19, 1983.12 On May 20, 1983, the day after New Jersey's
one year statute of limitations for libel had expired, plaintiff mailed process to
Time Inc.'s New Jersey agent.13 The agent received process on May 23, but
refused to accept it because the complaint did not designate Time as defend-
ant.14 Plaintiff amended the complaint on July 19, changing defendant to
"'Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated.' ,15
Time moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the statute of
8. For a discussion of Walker, see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
9. Schiavone v. Fortune, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 71 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 15
(3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986). The Schiavone Court considered three separate com-
plaints simultaneously filed against Fortune. The three plaintiffs (Ronald A. Schiavone, Genaro
Liquori, and Joseph DiCarlos) were executives of the Schiavone Construction Company.
10. Id. at 73; see Rowan, The Payoff Charges Against Reagan's Labor Secretary, FORTUNE,
May 30, 1982, at 80, 85-86. Fortune's article chronicled allegations against former Labor Secretary
Raymond J. Donovan, who owned part of the Schiavone Construction Company. Id. The alleged
defamatory statements described the scene of a bribe during a lunch meeting and placed plaintiffs at
the table. Id. Plaintiffs denied being present at the lunch. Schiavone, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Calla-
ghan) at 73.
11. Schiavone, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 73.
12. Id.
13. Id. The state statute provides: "Every action at law for libel or slander shall be com-
menced within 1 year next after the publication of the alleged libel or slander." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:14-3 (West 1952).
14. Schiavone, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 73. Each complaint named Fortune as de-
fendant and described the entity as "'a foreign corporation having its principal offices at Time and
Life Building, Sixth Avenue and 50th Street, New York, New York 10020." Schiavone, 106 S. Ct.
at 2381 (quoting petitioner's complaint). This case arose under rule 15(c) because Fortune is merely
the trade name for Time, the publisher, and on appeal, plaintiff did not claim that Fortune could be
sued as a separate legal entity. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 17; Schiavone, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
at 72, 76. Clearly, plaintiff should have named Time as a party. Arguably, plaintiff intended to sue
Time because plaintiff served process on Time's agent. Schiavone, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at
73. Furthermore, Time's agent noted the" 'discrepancy in corporate title'" and implicitly acknowl-
edged that Time was the proper defendant. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting from cover letter written by Time's agent). Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that plain-
tiff's misdescription amounted to no more than a misspelling. Id. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For discussion of misnomers and misdescriptions, see infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
15. Schiavone, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan ) at 72 (quoting plaintiff's amended complaint).
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limitations. Plaintiff invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), arguing
that the designation of Time in the amended complaint related back to the date
of the original complaint.16 The district court, agreeing with Time, dismissed
the complaint. The court declined to apply rule 15(c) because plaintiff had failed
to show that Time received notice of the libel suit within the one year statutory
period.1 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this
holding. 18 The appellate court read the clear and unequivocal language of the
rule as requiring that the added defendant receive notice within the statute of
limitations period.' 9
The United States Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the court of ap-
peals. 20 Agreeing with the district court's analysis, the Court held that the
phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against
[the relation-back defendant]" required the receipt of notice by the joined party
before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.2 ' The Court based
its decision on rule 15(c)'s plain language. Because Time did not receive notice
of the action until served with process four days after the statute of limitations
had run, plaintiff failed to fulfill the notice requirement of rule 15(c) and the
amended complaint could not relate back to the date of the original pleading.
The statute of limitations thus barred the action.22
Rule 15(c) permits the amendment changing the defendant to relate back to
the date of the original pleading if the "claim... in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth.., in the original plead-
ing . . . and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against" the added defendant, two requirements are met: (1) the new defendant
received notice so that "he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on
the merits"; and (2) the new defendant "knew or should have known that, but
for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against him."'23 The circuit courts split in the application of rule
16. Id. at 73-75. The district court did not consider whether the period for notice under rule
15(c) includes reasonable time for service of process. Id. at 75 n.l. On appeal, plaintiff raised the
issue of rule 15(c)'s notice requirement. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2382-83; Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 17-
18.
17. Schiavone, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 75.
18. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 15.
19. Id. at 18. The court of appeals said,
While we are sympathetic to plaintiff's arguments, we agree with the defendant that it is
not this court's role to amend procedural rules in accordance with our own policy prefer-
ences. We hold, therefore, that the period within which defendant must receive notice
under rule 15(c) does not include the time provided for service of process.
Id.
20. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2386.
21. Id. at 2385.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Trace X Chem. Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chem. Co., 724 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1983). For
the full text of rule 15(c), see supra note 2.
Prior to 1966, rule 15(c) provided:
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading.
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15(c) when the amendment changed the defendant after the statute of limitations
had run.24 The controversy among the circuit courts focused on whether the
phrase, "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against
[the relation-back defendant]," could be viewed flexibly. 25
The majority position construed rule 15(c) strictly.2 6 This literal interpre-
tation viewed the clear, explicit language of the rule as requiring that the rela-
tion-back defendant receive notice prior to the running of the statute of
limitations.27 The majority of courts read the express words of the rule as leav-
ing no room for deviance because "the period provided by law for commencing
the action" omits any mention of the period allowed for service of process.28
Thus, a court adhering to the literal approach would require a plaintiff seeking
the procedural benefits of rule 15(c) to satisfy each unambiguous provision and
See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee notes.
Rule 15(c) was revised because some courts had refused to allow amendments that added new
parties after the statute of limitations had run. See Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 249
(D. Del. 1965); Kerner v. Rackmill, 111 F. Supp. 150, 151 (M.D. Pa. 1953). These courts reasoned
that the addition of a new party created a new cause of action; therefore, the amendment did not
arise out of the original pleading, and the statute of limitations barred the change. Martz, 244 F.
Supp. at 249; Kerner, 111 F. Supp. at 151. Rule 15(c), in its present form, attempts to remedy what
commentators perceived as harsh results that defeated claims on a mere technical basis. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee notes ("[C]haracterization of the amendment as a new proceeding
is not responsive to the reality, but is merely question-begging; and to deny relation-back is to defeat
unjustly the claimant's opportunity to prove his case."); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at 504-07 (1971). By expressly allowing for the change of
parties, the Advisory Committee hoped to correct the inconsistent application of Rule 15(c) so that
actions would be decided on the merits. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1498, at 504-07. For
discussion of the historical treatment of changing parties under rule 15(c) and the separate standard
that developed for misnomers, see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
24. Some courts focused on the explicit requirements of the rule. E.g., Weisgal v. Smith, 774
F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir. 1985); Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2034 (1985); Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir.
1984); Trace X Chem. Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chem. Co., 724 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1983); Hughes v. United
States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982); Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 405 (6th
Cir. 1982); Odence v. Salmonson Ventures, 108 F.R.D. 163, 170 (D.R.I. 1983). Other courts and
judges, however, construed the rule as having a broader policy. E.g., Hendrix v. Memorial Hosp.,
776 F.2d 1255, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985); Ringrose, 692 F.2d at 410-11 (Jones, J., concurring); Kirk v.
Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1980); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571-72 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); United States ex rel. Arrow Elecs., Inc. v. G.H. Coffey Co.,
100 F.R.D. 413, 416 (D. Me. 1983).
25. See Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 105 S. Ct. 2034, 2036 (1985) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (disagreeing with the Court's denial of certiorari and discussing the split among the lower
courts).
26. See Weisgal v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir. 1985); Cooper, 740 F.2d at 716; Watson
v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1984); Trace X Chem. Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chem. Co.,
724 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1983); Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982); Ringrose
v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 405 (6th Cir. 1982); Odence v. Salmonson Ventures, 108
F.R.D. 163, 170 (D.R.I. 1985).
27. See, e.g., Weisgal, 774 F.2d at 1279 ("The language of the Rule requires, in plain and in
clear terms, that the notice be given 'within the limitations period.' "); Odence, 108 F.R.D. at 170
("When a change in the identity of parties is in prospect, 'notice of the institution of the action' must
be received [within the limitations period].").
28. See Weisgal, 774 F.2d at 1279); Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329, 332 (E.D.
Mo. 1980); FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c); cf. Walker, 446 U.S. at 752-53 (state law defines "commence-
ment" in diversity actions brought in federal court). For further discussion of Walker, see infra
notes 103-107 and accompanying text. For state law problems with the Schiavone Court's definition
of "commencement," see infra notes 102-22 and accompanying text.
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would refuse to grant a time extension through an unwarranted judicial gloss.29
The minority approach expanded-by judicial construction-the specified
period for notice under the rule.30 In Ingram v. Kumar 31 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit broke from the literal interpretation by
ruling that "the period provided by law for commencing the action against" the
added defendant includes an allowance of time for service of process during
which notice could be received. 32 The Ingram court permitted, under rule
15(c), plaintiff's amendment that changed the designated defendant from Vijaya
N. Kumar to Vijay S. Kumar even though the added defendant did not receive
notice until several weeks after the statute of limitations had run.33 The court
recognized that this flexible reading of rule 15(c)'s language would extend the
notice period beyond the statute of limitations in jurisdictions that allow service
after the statutory period's expiration. However, the court justified its result as
consistent with rule 15(c)'s purpose.3 4 To serve justice and avoid unduly harsh
results, the Ingram court adopted a flexible approach that would permit a deci-
sion on the merits. 35
On a superficial level, the conflict over the notice provision in rule 15(c)
raises a question of statutory construction. The Schiavone Court identified the
issue as a choice "between recognizing or ignoring what the Rule provides in
plain language";3 6 it thus adopted the literal interpretation. 37 Although this re-
29. See, eg., Weisgal, 774 F.2d at 1279; Hughes, 701 F.2d at 58 ; Odence, 108 F.R.D. at 171.
30. See Hendrix v. Memorial Hosp., 776 F.2d 1255, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985); Ringrose v. Engel-
berg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 410-11 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J., concurring); Kirk v. Cronvich, 629
F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1980); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); United States ex rel. Arrow Elecs. Inc. v. G.H. Coffey Co., 100 F.R.D.
413, 416 (D. Me. 1983).
31. 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979).
32. Id. at 571-72.
33. Id. at 567-68, 571-72.
34. Id. at 571. The court relied on the language of rule 15(a) to support its position. The rule
states:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calender, he may so amend it at
any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the
time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the
amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (emphasis added).
The Ingram court reasoned that the "when justice so requires" language of rule 15(a) applied to
all amendments. Thus, plaintiff's amendment under rule 15(c) would be allowed because justice
required the court to reach the merits of the case. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571-72.
35. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571. For further elaboration of the Ingram decision, see infra notes
53-58 and accompanying text; see also supra note 23 (rule 15(c) amended to permit change of parties
and thus avoid defeating actions on technicalities).
36. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385. The Court refused to view the issue as "a choice between a
'liberal' approach toward Rule 15(c), on the one hand, and a 'technical' interpretation of the Rule,
on the other hand." Id.
37. Id. This Note does not consider the type of notice that the relation-back defendant must
receive under the literal interpretation. Compare Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir.
1982) (requiring actual notice prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations) with Kirk v.
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suit is consistent with the principles of statutory construction, 38 the Court failed
to resolve the more basic issue that had split the circuit courts: the literal inter-
pretation of rule 15(c) creates a double standard under which a relation-back
defendant possesses more rights than the original defendant. 39 In jurisdictions
that permit service of process after the statute of limitations has expired, the
original defendant may receive notice of the suit when served after the statutory
period. The action is still commenced in a timely manner.40 In contrast, under
the Court's decision in Schiavone, a relation-back defendant must receive notice
prior to the running of the statute of limitations.4 1 Thus, the added defendant
not only benefits from a more stringent notice requirement than the original
defendant, but also receives more rights than the law would provide had the
original complaint designated the relation-back defendant as the proper party in
the first instance.42 Why the double standard? Not surprisingly, courts and
commentators have argued both sides of the double standard issue.4 3 The Schia-
vone Court, however, dismissed the minority position without discussing the
double standard or the accompanying policy ramifications of the double stan-
dard problem. The double standard remains; easy answers rarely satisfy.
The inherent defect in rule 15(c) did not suddenly emerge in Ingram.
Before the adoption of the proposed amendment that inserted the notice require-
ment in rule 15(c), 44 a "curious but minor difficulty of interpretation [arose]
over the language of the rule referring to the limitations period."'45 In Martz v.
Miller Brothers Co. ,46 the United States District Court for the District of Dela-
ware applied the proposed rule and discovered an "anomalous result" that
threatened to defeat the purpose for amending the rule.47 In Martz a common
agent for the original defendant and the relation-back defendant received pro-
cess three days after the statute of limitations had expired.48 Discussing the
Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1980) (viewing constructive or informal notice as sufficient
under rule 15(c)).
38. See Weisgal v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir. 1985) (court's responsibility is to apply
the rule as written); Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984) (adher-
ing to literal interpretation), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2034 (1985); Odence v. Salmonson Ventures, 108
F.R.D. 163, 170 (D.R.I. 1985) ("[C]onstruction of a rule of procedure must start with the verbiage
of the rule .... There is nothing uncertain or amphibolous in the plain wording of the rule.").
39. E.g., Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571 ("There is no reason why a misnamed defendant is entitled to
earlier notice than he would have received had the complaint named him correctly."). Plaintiff in
Schiavone argued that the literal interpretation of rule 15(c) created a "double standard" of notice
between the new defendant and the original defendant. Record at 5, Schiavone (No. 84-1839).
Thus, the Court was aware of the issue.
40. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571.
41. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
42. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571.
43. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
44. For the text of rule 15(c) prior to amendment and the reason for the amendment, see supra
note 23.
45. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. RE. 356, 410 (1967). Mr. Kaplan served as reporter for the
Advisory Committee from its organization in 1960 until he joined the Committee on July 1, 1966.
Id. at 356.
46. 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965).
47. Id. at 254. For the purpose behind the rule's amendment, see supra note 23.
48. Martz, 244 F. Supp. at 254.
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proposed rule the court explained that even though the delayed service timely
commenced the action against the original defendant, the theory of notice in-
serted into the rule prevented the amendment joining the new defendant from
relating back. 49 The rule produced this inconsistent treatment because state
statutes of limitations concentrate on filing the complaint rather than notifying
the defendant within the prescribed period.5 0 Thus, by gearing notice to the
statutory period, rule 15(c) determines joinder of the relation-back defendant
according to a standard that fails to appear in the statutes of limitations. Effect-
ing a significant transformation in the role of a state statute, the rule inserts a
notice provision where none had existed, and relation-back becomes more diffi-
cult for the plaintiff.5 1
After rule 15(c)'s adoption, courts applying the notice provision of the rule
confronted this anomalous result. The majority of courts opted for the literal
approach despite the resulting double standard.52 The Ingram court recognized
the inherent defect and, given the compelling circumstances, sought an interpre-
tation consistent with the rule's purpose.53 In Ingram plaintiff filed a medical
malpractice suit just before the statutory period's expiration and designated
Vijaya N. Kumar as defendant.5 4 Nearly fifteen weeks after the statute of limi-
tations had run, plaintiff realized that the complaint named the incorrect physi-
cian. Thus, plaintiff served Vijay S. Kumar, the proper defendant, with the
original complaint.55 The second defendant moved to dismiss on limitations
grounds. Plaintiff argued that, pursuant to rule 15(c), the amended complaint
naming Vijay S. Kumar related back to the date of the original pleading.56 Ad-
dressing the crucial notice element of rule 15(c), the court said:
49. The Martz court stated:
Thus, in this instance, under the proposed rule, we have the anomalous result that service
on dePolo as an agent of Miller Brothers Company would properly commence a law suit
although service on dePolo as an agent of Miller Brothers of Newark (should he be found
to be an agent) would not.
Id.
50, Haworth, Changing Defendants in Private Civil Actions under Federal Rule 15(c)-An An-
cient Problem Lingers On, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 552, 563. For discussion of the dual component of the
statute of limitations, see infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
51. The Martz court questioned whether the inconsistent result under the notice requirement
might defeat the purposes behind the change. Martz, 244 F. Supp. at 254 n.21. For proposed solu-
tions to the double standard, see infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 116-
18 and accompanying text (discussing the filing and service components of the statute of limitations).
52. See cases cited supra note 26.
53. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571-72. The difficulties encountered with the language of rule 15(c)
signaled the need for change in its application either by revised judicial interpretation or by further
amendment to the rule. Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c): Relation Back ofAmendments,
57 MINN. L. REv. 83, 104 (1972). For discussion of proposed amendments, see infra notes 123-27
and accompanying text.
54. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 567. Plaintiff sued on her own behalf and as administratrix of her
husband's estate. Id.
55. Id. Vijaya N. Kumar, a physician in Valhalla, New York, never treated the decedent. Af-
ter learning that Vijay S. Kumar resided in Jamestown, New York, plaintiff served defendant with
the original complaint that still misnamed the proper party. An error by plaintiff's attorney appar-
ently caused the confusion over the two physicians. Id.
56. Id. at 567-68. Plaintiff moved to amend under rule 15(c) to change defendant from Vijaya
N. Kumar to Vijay S. Kumar. Id.
[Vol. 65
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Although on its face the phrase, "within the period provided by law
for commencing the action against him," seems to mean the applicable
statute of limitations period, such a literal interpretation is unjustified
in jurisdictions where timely service of process can be effected after the
statute of limitations has run. In those jurisdictions, even an accu-
rately named defendant may not receive notice of the action against
him prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Yet there is no
doubt that the action against him is timely commenced. There is no
reason why a misnamed defendant is entitled to earlier notice than he
would have received had the complaint named him correctly.
57
Finding that justice compelled relation-back and a decision on the merits, the
Ingram court held that the period during which the relation-back defendant
must receive notice includes the time allowed for service of process.
58
Some courts have found the Ingram court's flexible approach consistent
with the basic purpose of rule 15(c). 59 Those judges who advocate the elimina-
tion of the double standard have justified their position with several arguments.
Because relation-back, in effect, treats the added defendant as if properly named
in the original complaint, no valid purpose exists for requiring more expeditious
notice than the defendant originally deserved under local law.60 Furthermore,
the rule's plain language supports the flexible interpretation. 6 1 The period pro-
vided by law for commencing the action against the defendant contains two
components: first, the complaint must be filed within a specific period; and sec-
ond, the action must be brought against the defendant through service of pro-
cess.62 Given the close historical relationship between the notice requirement
and the statute of limitations, proponents of the Ingram standard incorporate
57. Id. at 571. For analysis of the interaction between commencement in Rule 15(c) and state
law in diversity cases, see infra notes 102-22 and accompanying text.
58. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571-72. The court treated the amendment as a change of parties. Even
though defendant did not receive notice until four months after the statute of limitations had lapsed,
the court stated, "This case presents an excellent situation for specific application of the Rule's
general admonition that 'leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.'" Id. at 571
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). For the full text of Rule 15(a), see supra note 34.
59. See, e.g., Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980); United States ex rel. Arrow
Elecs. Inc. v. G.H. Coffey Co., 100 F.R.D. 413, 416 (D. Me. 1983); see also Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at
2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, the specific liberalizing purpose of the 1966 amendment to
the Rule is frustrated if the added language is construed to cut back on the number of cases in which
relation-back is permitted."); 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 15.15[2], at 15-146 (2d
ed. 1985) ("[T]he general philosophy of the pleading rules is that they should give fair notice, should
be liberally construed, be subject to liberal amendment, and that decisions should be on the merits
and not on technical niceties of pleading."); 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509, at 156 (1982) ("The thrust of Rule 15(c), after all, is to preserve
claims from extinction on technical limitations grounds while at the same time honoring the policies
underlying statutes of limitations.").
60. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2388-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller
Co., 692 F.2d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J., concurring); see also 3 J. MOORE, supra note 59,
% 15-15[2], at 15-144, 15-146 (notice provision involves consideration of the new defendant's rights if
he or she had been named in original complaint).
61. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ringrose, 692 F.2d at 410-11
(Jones, J., concurring).
62. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ringrose. 692 F.2d at 410-11
(Jones, J., concurring); see also infra notes 116-18 (discussing the filing and the service provisions
involved in "commencement").
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the filing and service components of the statute of limitations.63 Thus, Ingram's
progeny reject the overly mechanical, literal approach to rule 15(c) as not only
producing harsh results, but also failing to account for all the "components"
that determine the "period provided by law" for commencing the action against
the defendant. 64
Other courts have criticized the Ingram court's solution as contrary to set-
tled principles of statutory construction. 65 For followers of the literal approach,
the double standard does not undermine the purpose of rule 15(C). 6 6 Because
the rule operates as a special dispensation to the plaintiff who errs in the original
complaint, the plaintiff must comply with the rule's strict requirements. 67 Thus,
the double standard poses no threat to rule 15(c)'s purpose, and courts rejecting
Ingram have dismissed actions on limitations grounds when notice occurs after
the statutory period.68 Moreover, critics of the flexible approach argue that the
63. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("For the majority, relying so
heavily on what it views as the clarity of the language before it, ignores the mission and history of
Rule 15(c)."); Ringrose, 692 F.2d at 411 (Jones, J., concurring) ("[A] notice rule which accounts for
the standard tolling period as part of the 'period provided by law for commencing the action' prop-
erly recognizes the intimate connection between relation-back rules and the policy of the statute of
limitations."); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's notes ("Relation back is inti-
mately connected with the policy of the statute of limitations.").
64. Because the defendant usually receives notice through service of process rather than the
filing of the complaint, rule 15(c)'s notice provision should recognize the procedural devices allowed
under service of process rules, See Ringrose, 692 F.2d at 410-11 (Jones, J., concurring) (timely
service under state law should satisfy rule 15(c)); United States ex rel. Arrow Elecs. Inc. v. G.H.
Coffey, Co., 100 F.R.D. 413, 416-17 (D. Me. 1983) (notice within the 120 days allowed for service of
process under federal rules of civil procedure accommodates statute of limitations). For criticism of
Arrow, see Note, United States ex rel. Arrow Electronics, Inc. v. G.H. Coffey Co.: Judicial Interpre-
tation of Timely Notice Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 37 ME. L. REv. 153 (1985).
The question arises whether the arguably harsh results produced by the double standard paral-
lel the unjust results that led to the amendment of rule 15(c) in 1966. For the text of pre-1966 rule
15(c) and the reason for its amendment, see supra note 23; see also infra notes 81-85 and accompany-
ing text (rule 15(c) amended to eliminate the inconsistent treatment of misnomers and changing
parties); infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text (proposed amendments to present rule 15(c)).
65. E.g., Weisgal v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir. 1985) (court's responsibility is to
apply the rule as written); Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984)
(adhering to literal interpretation), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2034 (1985); Odence v. Salmonson Ven-
tures, 108 F.R.D. 163, 170 (D.R.I. 1985) ("[C]onstruction of a rule of procedure must start with the
verbiage of the rule .... There is nothing uncertain or amphibolous in the plain wording of the
rule."). It is argued that rewriting a federal rule through judicial interpretation would invade the
province of the legislature. Cooper, 740 F.2d at 716-17. But cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (authorizing
the United States Supreme Court to prescribe the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the Rules
Enabling Act.); infra note 128 (discussing Supreme Court control over the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
66. By its express terms rule 15(c) distinguishes between the original and the relation-back
defendant. Rule 15(c) focuses on the notice and the knowledge of the added defendant, although
those factors would be irrelevant for analyzing the original defendant. See Tretter v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329, 332 (E.D. Mo. 1980). In contrast, the Ingram court concentrated on the
plaintiff's motive and intent. See Holden v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 82 F.R.D. 157, 160-61 n.1
(M.D.N.C. 1979) (discussing Ingram at length). Thus, the flexible interpretation improperly shifts
the court's attention from protecting the relation-back defendant's rights to mitigating the plaintiff's
hardship. Id.
67. E.g., Odence v. Salmonson Ventures, 108 F.R.D. 163, 171 (D.R.I. 1985).
68. See Weisgal v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1985); Cooper v. United States Postal Serv.,
740 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2034 (1985); Odence v. Salmonson Ventures,
108 F.R.D. 163 (D.R.I. 1985). The court in Odence also stressed plaintiff's fault for the dismissal:
"Had he not dawdled in the eleventh hour, he would not be caught in the time warp which he now
brands as 'unfair.'" Odence, 108 F.R.D. at 172. TheSchiavone Court echoed the belief that plaintiff
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Ingram court's reformulation destroys the carefully structured prerequisites
designed to allow relation-back despite the added defendant's limitations defense
under local law. 69 The literal interpretation, on the other hand, strikes the
proper balance under rule 15(c) by upholding the values of repose, certainty, and
finality associated with the policy behind statutes of limitations, but permitting
the court to reach the merits of the case when justice requires.70
The double standard inherent in rule 15(c) has evoked valid arguments for
both sides. The Schiavone Court, however, failed to address the double stan-
dard.71 The Court arguably alluded to the problem by stating: "The linchpin is
notice, and notice within the limitations period. Of course, there is an element
of arbitrariness here, but that is characteristic of any limitations period. And it
is an arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial process." '72
If the "linchpin is notice," however, consideration of the double standard should
have appeared at the forefront of the decision-especially because the inherent
defect in the notice requirement touched off the dispute among the circuit
courts. 73 A thorough decision would have discussed the minor difficulty that
blossomed into a significant policy question concerning the purpose of rule
15(c). 74 Even though the notice issue can be neatly dispensed with thorough
statutory construction, the double standard remains.
The need to resolve the double standard becomes even more compelling
had caused the predicament: "We cannot understand why, in litigation of this asserted magnitude,
Time was not named specifically as the defendant in the caption and in the body of each complaint."
Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2383.
69. See Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Holden v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Indus., 82 F.R.D. 157 (M.D.N.C. 1979). Without rule 15(c)'s safeguards, depriving the rela-
tion-back defendant of the statute of limitations defense might raise questions of procedural due
process. See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498,
at 250 (Supp. 1986). But see infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (rule 15(c) necessarily in-
volves issues of substance and procedure).
70. See Weisgal v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1985); Cooper v. United States Postal Serv.,
740 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2034 (1985); Odence v. Salmonson Ventures,
108 F.R.D. 163 (D.R.I. 1985); see also Note, supra note 64, at 165 (the value of a definite period
outweighs any potential problems of anomalous result). One court has even suggested that although
Ingram's interpretation works well in compelling situations, the potential for abuse in applying rule
15(c) is too great under the flexible analysis. Holden v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 82 F.R.D. 157, 160-61
n.1 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
71. Plaintiff in Schiavone argued that the restrictive view of rule 15(c) operates to preclude
relation-back, unless notice reaches the party to be brought in, before the Statute of Limi-
tations has run, because, for some never articulated reason, it is essential that a new party,
unlike the original party, have the running head start of knowing that he is in Court sooner
than justice, under the Rules, commands for the original party.
Record at 24, Schiavone (No. 84-1839). Thus, plaintiff's double standard argument presented the
Court with an opportunity to articulate some reason for the inconsistency.
72. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385. Yet, the arbitrariness in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is imposed by the Supreme Court through its power under the Rules Enabling Act. See infra note
128 (noting power of Supreme Court over interpretation and amendment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35 (discussing the Ingram court's efforts to deal with
this defect).
74. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The principal purpose of Rule
15(c) is to enable a plaintiff to correct a pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if the
correction will not prejudice his adversary in any way. That purpose is defeated-and the Rule
becomes largely superfluous-if it is construed to require the correction to be made before the statute
has run.").
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when the original defendant and the relation-back defendant are essentially the
same party. Plaintiff in Schiavone recognized that notice within the statutory
period may involve valid concerns when a truly new defendant is joined. How-
ever, when both defendants are connected by an identity of interest, the notice
requirement impedes justice.75 The "identity of interest doctrine" holds that the
institution of an action against the original defendant provides constructive no-
tice to other parties subsequently added under rule 15(c) if the original and rela-
tion-back defendants are closely related in business operations or other
activities. 76 Because Fortune is the trade name of its publisher, Time Inc., the
Schiavone Court considered the identity of interest concept. 77 Consistent with
the literal approach, the Court reasoned that even if the doctrine applied, plain-
tiff's failure to serve Fortune within the statute of limitations proved fatal.78
For the notice imputed to the added defendant to be effective under rule 15(c),
the original defendant must have received notice prior to the lapse of the statu-
tory period.79 In Schiavone no proper notice could be imputed under the iden-
tity of interest doctrine because both Fortune and Time received process after
the one year period. s0
Another identity-related issue that arises from Schiavone concerns the treat-
ment of misnomers and misdescriptions under rule 15(C). 81 Historically, a sepa-
rate, liberal standard existed for misnomers such that an amendment correcting
a minor misdescription merely had to arise out of the same occurrence to relate
back under rule 15(c).8 2 When the Advisory Committee amended the rule to
provide expressly for changing defendants, the Committee consciously abolished
75. Record at 27, Schiavone (No. 84-1839).
76. E.g., Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 102-03 (1st Cir. 1979); 6 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 69, § 1499, at 268. The Hernandez court stated,
The identity of interest principle is often applied where the original and added parties are a
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, two related corporations whose of-
flcers, directors, or shareholders are substantially identical and who have similar names or
share office space, past and present forms of the same enterprise, or co-executors of an
estate.
Hernandez, 604 F.2d at 103.
77. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384.
78. Id.
79. The Court described the doctrine as an "exception... to avoid the application of the statute
of limitations when no prejudice would result to the party sought to be added." Id. However, even
though the delayed service caused no prejudice to Time, the Court nevertheless required compliance
with the notice requirement. The Court's view of notice and prejudice thus creates a dual standard
under rule 15(c). Notice is no longer tied to prejudice, but becomes instead a technical requirement
that in itself can prevent application of relation-back principles. See infra notes 90, 129 and accom-
panying text.
80. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384.
81. The Schiavone Court failed to deal with the misnomer issue. Justice Stevens, in dissent,
noted this flav in the majority's opinion. Id. at 2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Schiavone,
750 F.2d at 17 (expressing no opinion whether the literal interpretation applies to misnomers).
82. See Archuleta v. Duffy's, Inc., 471 F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing between
misnomers and the substitution of parties, with a more lenient standard applying to misnomers);
Martz, 244 F. Supp. at 249 (recognizing misnomer analysis differs from that applied to changing
parties); see also Armijo v. Welmaker, 58 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Ariz. 1973) (transposition of the
defendant's name on the original complaint tolls the statute of limitations for amendment); Wentz v.
Alberto Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327, 1328-29 (D. Mont. 1969) (misnomers and misdescriptions
can be corrected under the standard of the first sentence of Rule 15(c)).
[Vol. 65
1987] NOTICE AND RELATION BACK UNDER RULE 15(c) 609
the dichotomy that previously had existed between correcting misnomers and
adding new defendants.8 3 Under the present form of rule 15(c), which includes
the notice requirement, an amendment that corrects a misnomer or a misde-
scription of the defendant is treated as changing a party.84 Given this historical
union of misnomers and changing a party for relation-back purposes, the sepa-
rate standard for misnomers is a dead letter.85 Thus, rule 15(c)'s notice require-
ment applies to situations involving misnomers and misdescriptions as well as to
situations in which defendants are truly changed.
Under Schiavone a court must scrutinize misnomers and misdescriptions in
the original complaint under the literal interpretation when the plaintiff seeks to
relate back the amended pleading. 86 Therefore, the court must dismiss the
plaintiff's action when an incorrect description of the defendant appears in the
original complaint, if the defendant did not receive notice within the statute of
limitations.87 A hypothetical illustrates Schiavone's application to misnomers
and misdescriptions. Suppose plaintiff in Schiavone had named "Time Incorpo-
rated" as defendant in the original complaint. Suppose further that "Time
Inc.," not "Time Incorporated" was the accurate description of the corporate
83. The Advisory Committee noted, "Rule 15(c) is amplified to state more clearly when an
amendment of a pleading changing the party against whom a claim is asserted (including an amend-
ment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant) shall 'relate back' to the date of the
original pleading." FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's notes (emphasis added). By pre-
scribing the procedure for changing the defendant, the Committee hoped to correct the inconsistent
treatment of misnomers and of the addition of new parties that had developed under the old rule
15(c). Id. For the text of rule 15(c) prior to amendment and its application to amendments chang-
ing parties, see supra note 23.
84. The court in Ingram, although known for its flexible approach to rule 15(c)'s notice provi-
sion, concluded that the rule's history and the weight of authority required amendments correcting
misnomers to be analyzed under a changing the party standard. Further, the court observed, "Anal-
ysis of 'relation back' ... is better accomplished through application of specific guidelines in the
second sentence of Rule 15, than by attempting to draw an arbitrary line between misnomers and
changes of party." Ingram, 585 F.2d at 570.
85. The Advisory Committee's elimination of the separate standard for misnomers is given even
more weight in light of the Schiavone decision. Equating the notice requirement with the statute of
limitations, the Court relied heavily on the Advisory Committee's comments. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct.
at 2385. To be consistent with the significance placed on the Advisory Committee's notes in Schia-
vone, the Court would have to uphold the union of standards under the second sentence of rule 15(c)
in future cases involving misnomers. But see Archuleta v. Duffy's Inc., 471 F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir.
1973) (recognizing a liberal standard for misnomers under present rule 15(c)); Wentz v. Alberto
Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327, 1328-29 (D. Mont. 1969) (changing the party criteria inapplicable to
misnomers).
86. Schiavone requires that the relation-back defendant receive notice prior to the expiration of
the statute of limitations. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385. The notice requirement applies to amend-
ments correcting misnomers that relate back under rule 15(c). For treatment of misnomers under
rule 15(c), see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
87. E.g., Archuleta v. Duffy's, Inc., 471 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1973). Plaintiff in Archuleta filed
suit within the statutory period against "Denver Pop Company.... formerly known as and d/b/a/
Duffy's Inc." Id. at 34. Plaintiff served process after the statute of limitations had run. Id.
Although the same person owned both Denver Pop and Duffy's, the two corporations were separate
and unrelated. Plaintiff should have named Duffy's as defendant, but the Colorado Secretary of
State incorrectly described the entities when contacted by plaintiff's attorney. Id. at 34 n.2. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused to apply rule 15(c) to plaintiff's
amended complaint naming Duffy's as defendant, and the statute of limitations barred the action.
The dissent in Archuleta recognized that plaintiff sued the right party under the wrong name
and criticized the majority's rigid view of the notice requirement as "not only unjust, but out of tune
with the philosophy as well as the terms of Rule 15(c)." Id. at 39 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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entity that published Fortune.88 If plaintiff served the named defendant after
the statutory limitations period had expired, Time could defend the action suc-
cessfully on limitations grounds. Because Time did not receive notice within the
period prescribed by the literal interpretation, plaintiff's amended complaint
correcting the inaccuracy could not relate back under rule 15(c). 89 Under
Schiavone the case would be dismissed.90 The same inequitable result would
follow had plaintiff described Fortune as a subsidiary or division of Time. 91 De-
spite plaintiff's plain and unequivocal intent to sue Time, the court, bound by
Schiavone, would have to dismiss the action because the inaccuracies in the com-
plaint could not be cured by rule 15(c). 92
88. The Schiavone Court said, "An examination of the magazine's masthead clearly would have
revealed the corporate entity responsible for the publication." Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2383-84.
Throughout its opinion the Court referred to "Time Incorporated." Yet, examination of the mast-
head of several magazines distributed by Time (including Time, People, Life, and Fortune) reveals
that "Time Inc.," with its principle office at the Time & Life Building in New York, publishes the
work. Even though "Inc." and "Incorporated" differ only in form, not substance, the Schiavone
Court's literal interpretation concentrates on form: notice is a technical requirement. The hypo-
thetical's reasoning applies to any deviation in the original complaint that fails to designate precisely
the defendant's specific identification.
89. The dissent in Schiavone recognized the inequity caused by a mere discrepancy in corporate
title:
Because petitioners committed the 'fatal' error of identifying the defendant by its name of
publication rather than by its name of incorporation, however, the Court finds that they
fell through a trap door-despite the fact that the magazine publisher's agent contempora-
neously noted his understanding that the suits were directed against the magazine pub-
lisher (Time Incorporated) fully as much as if the petitioners had included the magic
words.
Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations ommitted).
90. Does Schiavone drastically shift the focus in rule 15(c) from prejudice to notice, thereby
twisting the application of relation-back? For a discussion of the prejudice element in the rule, see
infra note 129 and accompanying text. Surely, the plaintiff believes that the original complaint
names the correct adversary. Yet, even though no doubt exists concerning the intended defendant,
the cautious (and intelligent) plaintiff will avoid Schiavone's application by serving the named de-
fendant prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In such a case rule 15(c) will permit
relation-back provided that a misnomer exists, or the original defendant and the relation-back de-
fendant have an identity of interest. For a discussion of identity of interest, see supra notes 75-80
and accompanying text; for a discussion of misnomers, see supra, notes 81-87 and accompanying
text. Thus, Schiavone's effect on the notice requirement severely limits the application of rule 15(c)
unless the plaintiff discovers the mistake and remedies it before the statutory period expires, or by
some stroke of luck, the relation-back defendant received notice within the statute of limitations.
The availability of rule 15(c) thus is sharply curtailed. Moreover, what effect will Schiavone have injurisdictions that allow the plaintiff to serve process on the defendant after the statutory period? For
state law implications of the Schiavone decision, see infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
91. In Schiavone plaintiff's amended complaint failed to join Time as a separate defendant, but
only designated the adversary as "Fortune, also known as Time Incorporated." Schiavone, 106 S.
Ct. at 2380. The Court reacted to this amended description: "While the statement, 'Fortune, also
known as Time Incorporated, was and is a corporation of the state of New York,' is not a model of
accuracy, it does focus on Time and sufficiently describes Time as the targeted defendant." Id. at
2384. Does the literal approach allow the Court to consider the plaintiff's intent or target? Clearly,
plaintiff intended to include Time in the libel suit because plaintiff served Time's New Jersey agent.
Id. at 2380. Also, plaintiff's amended complaint still failed to name defendant correctly because
Fortune did not exist as a corporate entity. See supra note 88 (discussing Time's specific title).
Because misnomers and misdescriptions must comply with all requirements of rule 15(c), the defend-
ant incorrectly designated in the original complaint must receive notice regardless of the plaintiff's
intent. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Thus, the notice requirement provides a tech-
nical loophole allowing the original defendant to escape when the plaintiff's complaint is not a model
of accuracy.
92. The question arises whether the framers of rule 15(c) intended this result. For the intent of
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Not only did the Schiavone Court fail to address the double standard and
misnomer problems, it also failed to consider questions concerning the applica-
tion of state law. The district court in Schiavone exercised jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship. 93 In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 94 the Supreme
Court held that under the Constitution federal courts hearing diversity cases
must apply state law when deciding substantive issues.95 Rule 15(c), although a
procedural device, involves state substantive rights because relation-back de-
prives the added defendant of the limitations defense under state law. 9 6 In
Hanna v. Plumer,97 however, the Court rejected the Erie doctrine's application
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.98 The Hanna Court presumed the va-
lidity of the federal rules under the Rules Enabling Act and held that federal
procedure prevails over contrary state practice. 99 Rule 15(c) is thus presumed
valid under Hanna.10 0 Even though rule 15(c) is valid in terms of Erie's consti-
the Advisory Committee to Rule 15(c), see supra notes 23, 83. Given the potentially unjust results
that may occur when courts apply the literal interpretation to misnomers and misdescriptions, an-
other split may surface in the circuit courts. To avoid Schiavone courts might apply only the first
sentence of rule 15(c) to minor inaccuracies. See Archuleta v. Duffy's, Inc., 471 F.2d 33, 35 (10th
Cir. 1973); Wentz v. Alberto Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327, 1328-29 (D. Mont. 1969); Martz, 244 F.
Supp. at 253-54; Armijo v. Welmaker, 58 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Ariz. 1973). For the possibility of
amending rule 15(c) to provide a separate standard for misnomers and misdescriptions, see infra
notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
93. Schiavone, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 72; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(1) (1982) (di-
versity of citizenship jurisdiction).
94. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
95. Id. at 78. "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a State .... And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts." Id.
96. Furthermore, rule 15(c) might permit relation-back when contrary state law is more restric-
tive. See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 59, at § 4509 (discussing
the relationship between Erie and Rule 15(c)).
97. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
98. Id. at 470-72. Hanna decided the adequacy of service in a diversity suit. Id. at 462. The
state law required service in hand but Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1) permitted service by
leaving a copy of the complaint at the defendant's residence. Id. at 461-62. The Hanna Court held
that Rule 4(d)(1) controls the method of service for diversity actions brought in the federal courts.
Id. at 474.
99. The majority in Hanna stated:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules .... the court has been instructed
to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question trans-
gresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
Id. at 471. The Rules Enabling Act provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to pre-
scribe procedural rules, but "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). Adhering to Hanna, the Court has said that the Erie doctrine is not the
appropriate test for analyzing the validity and applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Walker, 446 U.S. at 747-48 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-72).
100. This Note does not attempt to discuss all the substantive and procedural implications of
rule 15(c). See generally 3 J. MOORE, supra note 59, 15.15[2], at 15-141 to -142 (Rule 15(c) is
solely procedural and outside scope of Erie); 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note
59, § 4509, at 149-51 (balancing substantive intrusion under rule 15(c) with the need for comprehen-
sive, uniform system of procedure in federal courts); Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After
the Death of Diversity?, 78 MIcii. L. REv. 311, 363-64 (1980) (federal rule presumed not to violate
substantive right). Given the Schiavone decision, will the Court eventually face the substantive
problems involved in Rule 15(c)'s application? For state law implications of Rule 15(c), see infra
text accompanying notes 110-22; see also Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1974)
(rejecting application of federal rule 15(c) in favor of more liberal state procedure). For a discussion
of Marshall, see infra note 119.
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tutional mandate and in terms of the Rules Enabling Act, the question still re-
mains whether these facts address the precise issue before the Court in
Schiavone.10
The exact issue before the Schiavone Court involved the interpretation of
the phrase, "within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against [the relation-back defendant]," for purposes of notice under rule
15(C).10 2 To resolve this issue, the Court should have relied on precedent. In
Walker the Court decided whether state law or the federal rule should determine
"when the action is commenced for purposes of tolling the state statute of limita-
tions" in a diversity suit.10 3 Plaintiff in Walker contended that, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3,104 the diversity action commenced when the
complaint was filed. State law did not deem the action "commenced" for tolling
the statute of limitations until the plaintiff had served process on the defend-
ant.10 5 After considering Hanna, the Court held that the state statute defining
commencement was "a statement of a substantive decision by that State that
actual service on, and accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an integral
part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations." 10 6 Thus, rule 3's
definition of commencement had no influence on the tolling of the state statute
of limitations. 107
In defining the notice period in Schiavone, the Court equated the statute of
limitations with the language appearing in rule 15(c).108 Justifying its refusal to
extend the limitations period under the flexible approach, the Court stated:
Rule 3 concerns the "commencement" of a civil action. Under Rule
15(c), the emphasis is upon "the period provided by law for commenc-
ing the action against" the defendant. An action is commenced by the
filing of a complaint and, so far as Time is concerned, no complaint
against it was filed on or prior to May 19, 1983.109
Why did the Schiavone court ignore Walker?110 State law, not rule 3, deter-
101. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752 (Hanna inapplicable when federal rule not directly on point);
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 59, at 385 (4th ed. 1983) (federal rule may not "[speak] to
the precise issue before the court").
102. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
103. Walker, 466 U.S. at 741.
104. Rule 3 provides simply that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court." FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
105. Walker, 466 U.S. at 742-43.
106. Id. at 751.
107. Id. The Court said that rule 3 did not directly address the issue in Walker because the rule
operates as a timing mechanism, not as a tolling provision. Id. at 750-51. Moreover, the Hanna
analysis applies only to cases in which a direct conflict exists between the federal rule and state law.
Id. at 752. Thus, the paramount question that a court must face when dealing with state substantive
law and a federal rule is whether the rule covers the specific issue raised in the case. See also Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (state law determines when a diversity action is
commenced in the federal courts).
108. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
109. Id. at 2384.
110. Plaintiff in Schiavone raised the Walker question in the appeal from the district court deci-
sion, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to address the argument
on the merits. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 18-19.
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mines the commencement of an action for tolling the statute of limitations. 1 1
Given the intimate connection between rule 15(c) and the statute of limitations,
state law, rather than the federal rules, should control the interpretation of "the
period provided by law for commencing the action against" the relation-back
defendant. 112
Other courts have recognized the precedential effect of Walker when apply-
ing rule 15(c). 113 In Hunt v. Broce Construction Co. 114 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that Walker controlled diversity suits
involving rule 15(c) and that the state's definition of "commencement" deter-
mines "the period provided by law for commencing the action against" the rela-
tion-back defendant.1 15 To commence an action under the state law applicable
in Hunt, the plaintiff had to file the complaint and serve the defendant within
two years after the incident. If the plaintiff attempted but failed to serve process
during the prescribed period, state law extended the service period for an addi-
tional sixty days from the unsuccessful attempt, thus extending the statute of
limitations. 116 The Hunt court permitted the action to relate back under rule
15(c) despite the added defendant's failure to receive notice within the two year
statutory period because plaintiff had served defendant within the sixty day at-
tempt-to-serve grace period.1 17 "Commencement" for tolling the statute of limi-
tations in Hunt thus involved two components: filing and service. By the same
token, if state law "commencement" embodies both filing the complaint within
the prescribed period and serving process during a reasonable time thereafter,
that state law definition should determine whether the action is barred by the
statute of limitations.1 18 Moreover, should not "commencement" for tolling the
111. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751.
112. Even though rule 3 governs various timing provisions of the Federal Rules, the Walker
analysis controls the definition of "commencement" under the statute of limitations. Walker, 446
U.S. at 751. The Schiavone Court viewed the plain language of rule 15(c) as mandating application
of the state statute of limitations. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385. Thus, even though the Court
recognized the state law's substantive role in the rule by providing the period for notice, the Court
overlooked Walker and defined "commencement" according to outdated legal reasoning.
113. See, e.g., Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1388 (10th Cir. 1984); Ringrose v. En-
gelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 405 (6th Cir. 1982); Odence v. Salmonson Ventures, 108 F.R.D.
163, 167 n.3 (D.R.I. 1985). Most courts find state law and rule 15(c) compatible, thereby avoiding
the complex Walker issue. See id.
114. 674 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1982).
115. Id. at 836.
116. The original statute provided:
An action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article, as to each de-
fendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him .... An attempt to commence
an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of
this article, when the party faithfully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure service;
but such attempt must be followed by the first publication or service of the summons
within sixty days.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 97 (West 1960) (repealed 1984). Oklahoma law now states: "A civil
action is commenced by filing a petition with the court." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2003 (West
Supp. 1987).
117. Hunt, 674 F.2d at 837-38.
118. See Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co. 692 F.2d 403, 407-09 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J., con-
curring). The Ringrose concurrence acknowledged that Michigan law tolled the statute of limita-
tions to allow service of process. Id. at 409 (Jones, J., concurring). The tolling provision for service,
however, had been construed as merely procedural by the Michigan Supreme Court. Id. (citing
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statute of limitations be equated with the commencement provision in rule
15(c)'s notice requirement? Walker commands consistent treatment of
"commencement." 1 19
The Schiavone Court overlooked the Walker implications when it inter-
preted "the period provided by law for commencing the action against" the rela-
tion-back defendant according to rule 3.120 Even though rule 15(c) may be a
procedural device protected under Hanna, the rule's plain language does not
necessarily define the notice period. Because of the close relationship between
the rule and the statute of limitations, the Court should have defined "com-
mencement" under state law, especially if state law focuses on filing and ser-
vice.121 As valid precedent Walker establishes state law as the source for
determining "the period provided by law for commencing the action against"
the relation-back defendant under rule 15(c). 122
Clearly, the notice provision in rule 15(c) implicates more than the question
of statutory construction resolved by the Schiavone Court. Criticism without
alternatives, however, is unresponsive. Because judicial interpretation provides
an inadequate solution at best, commentators arguing to correct the inherent
defect in the notice requirement have concentrated on the amendment pro-
Busciano v. Rhodes, 385 Mich. 474, 189 N.W.2d 202 (1971)). Given that the federal procedure and
state practice would yield the same result, the concurrence declined to decide the effect of Walker
and Hanna on rule 15(c). Id.; see also supra note 90 (discussing Schiavone's practical impact on
service of process by plaintiffs).
119. A more troublesome problem arises when state law is more liberal than the federal rules so
that rule 15(c) bars the changing of a party that state law permits. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note
101, § 59, at 384; 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 59, § 4509, at 152-59. The
state's substantive policy decision in such cases favors resolving disputes on the merits and, in effect,
tolls the statute of limitations through the procedure provided in the relation-back practice. Id.
In Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (Ist Cir. 1974), plaintiff sued in federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction. The original complaint named the person whose name appeared in the town
records as the proprietor of the business where the injury occured. The named defendant, however,
had conveyed the business to another person several years before the accident, but had neglected to
amend the certificate. Id. at 40. Plaintiff's amended complaint sought to add the present owner of
the business after the statutory period had expired. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit faced the Massachusetts procedural rule that permitted relation-back to change a party
whenever the amendment arose out of the same transaction or occurrence. See MASS. R. Civ. P.
15(c). The court interpreted the state rule as a tolling provision, reasoning that "an action is com-
menced within the meaning of the Massachusetts statute of limitations although the wrong defend-
ant is named, so long as it appeared that the correct defendant had been the one intended."
Marshall, 508 F.2d at 44; see 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 59, § 4509, at
153. Thus, despite the presumed validity of rule 15(c) under Hanna, the court applied the more
liberal state rule. Marshall, 508 F.2d at 44; see also Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427 (D. Mass.
1981) (supporting the Marshall decision and reasoning). But see Comment, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-The Erie Doctrine-State Relation-Back Provision Found Controlling Over Rule 15(c)-
Marshall v. Mulrenin, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 952 (1975) (criticizing the court's analysis in Marshall).
120. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385. The Court's reliance on rule 3 indicates that it consid-
ered the definition of "commencement" under rule 15(c) as a purely federal question. The Court's
position on commencement thus contradicts its emphasis on the connection between the statute of
limitations and the rule's plain language.
121. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (relation of rule 15(c) and the statute of
limitations).
122. Would partial scrutiny of rule 15(c) under Walker open the door for questioning the rule's
underlying validity? Walker is valid precedent for determining the definition of"commencement" in
diversity suits, and the Court eventually will have to consider the substantive aspects of rule 15(c).
See supra note 96 and accompanying text for one substantive effect of rule 15(c).
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cess. 123 To avoid the double standard, one proposal would amend the language
in rule 15(c) to require notice" 'within the period provided by law for commenc-
ing the action against [the defendant] and serving him with notice of the ac-
tion.' "124 A second alternative would solve the controversy by replacing the
phrase in rule 15(c) with a definite statement that notice must be received
"within the statute of limitations." 125 A third approach would create a separate
standard for misnomers and misdescriptions. 126 Under this alternative when an
inaccuracy existed in the complaint, the court would concentrate on the plain-
tiff's intent as evidenced by the facts and determine objectively whether the
plaintiff originally intended to sue the defendant sought to be added under rule
15(c). The standard for joining "new" defendants would remain unchanged. 127
No amendment will be enacted until the United States Supreme Court real-
izes the inadequacy of its solution and takes the appropriate steps to remedy
it.12 8 Clearly, the easy answer offered by the Court fails to satisfy because the
double standard remains. The Court's literal approach in Schiavone sharply
curtails the availability of rule 15(c) to cure procedural defects and defeats the
rule's purpose that amendments should be allowed when a mere technicality
prevents reaching the merits of the action. Because the Court's decision fore-
closes change through judicial interpretation, rule 15(c) should be amended to
strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the rights of the
123. See Note, supra note 53, at 104. "Such difficulties with the language 'within the period
provided by law for commencing the action against him' indicates [sic] a need either for a revised
interpretation or for an amendment." Id. The Court's decision in Schiavone effectively precludes
judicial interpretation as a means of reformation.
124. Martz, 244 F. Supp. at 254 n.21; see also Haworth, supra note 50, at 563-64 (discussing the
need for specified time for service under the Martz approach); Note, supra note 53, at 105 (Martz
proposal corrects defect, but avoids risk of prejudice).
Under Walker the Martz proposal would have to be tied to state law. Thus, the additional
language would only extend the notice period in jurisdictions that permit service after the statute of
limitations has expired. See Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571.
125. E.g., Note, supra note 64, at 163 n.72. The Schiavone Court adopted this approach through
judicial interpretation. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
To be consistent with Walker, federal courts applying rule 15(c) in diversity actions must deter-
mine whether the state provision for service represents a procedural device or a substantive policy
decision to toll the statute of limitations. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. Compare
Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1982) (period for service beyond the stat-
ute of limitations merely procedural) with Hunt, 674 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1982) (attempt-to-serve
grace period tolled the statute of limitations).
126. See Haworth, supra note 50, at 559. This approach stems from a test proposed by Professor
Moore for correcting misnomers in amendments. Moore wrote:
In cases involving a misnomer of the defendant, the test should be whether, on the basis of
an objective standard, it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff had in mind a particular
entity or person, merely made a mistake as to the name, and actually served the entity or
person intended, or whether plaintiff actually meant to serve and sue a different person.
2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.44. at 4-418 (2d ed. 1986); see also
Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 7 (5th Cir. 1958) (applying Moore's test prior to the adoption of the
notice requirement in rule 15(c)).
127. See supra note 126. The objective test would, in limited circumstances, shift the court's
focus from the relation-back defendant to the plaintiff's intent. See supra note 66 (criticism of In-
gram for distorting the rule's intention).
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The United States Supreme Court controls both the interpre-
tation and the amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The question thus arises:
Will the inherent defect in rule 15(c) disappear after Schiavone, or will the Court be forced to resolve
the double standard and the Walker issues in the future?
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relation-back defendant. The new rule should focus on a two-step test: (1) the
amended complaint must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
original pleading, and (2) the relation-back defendant should not be prejudiced
in defending the action on the merits. The change to a general prejudice stan-
dard would allow courts to consider factors such as notice, knowledge of the
mistake, and the applicable statute of limitations. 129 Furthermore, courts could
weigh the prejudice to the relation-back defendant and consider what the result
would have been if the plaintiff had properly named the defendant in the first
instance. Preoccupied with elevating notice to a threshold requirement, the
Schiavone Court completely ignored the prejudice element. In light of the
problems still remaining after Schiavone, the Court should amend rule 15; to be
effective, rule 15(c) should implement justice, not technicalities.
JOSEPH DORNFRIED
129. Rule 15(c) should concentrate on avoiding prejudice. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2389
(Stevens, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Arrow Elecs. Inc. v. G.H. Coffey Co., 100 F.R.D. 413,
416 (D. Me. 1983). According to the rule's plain language, notice merely gauges prejudice. FED. R.
Civ. P. 15(c) (the relation-back defendant receives "such notice of the institution of the action that
he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits"). Does the Schiavone Court
presume that inadequate notice automatically equals prejudice? For a discussion of the Court's
separation of the notice requirement from prejudice, see supra note 90.
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